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Abstract—The search for lightweight authentication protocols
suitable for low-cost RFID tags constitutes an active and chal-
lenging research area. In this context, a family of protocols based
on the LPN problem has been proposed: the so-called HB-family.
Despite the rich literature regarding the cryptanalysis of these
protocols, there are no published results about the impact of fault
analysis over them. The purpose of this paper is to fill this gap by
presenting a fault analytic method against a prominent member
of the HB-family: HB+ protocol. We demonstrate that the fault
analysis model can lead to a flexible and effective attack against
HB-like protocols, posing a serious threat over them.
Index Terms—Fault analysis, authentication protocols, HB+
protocol, RFID systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
HB-family. Recently, radio frequency identification (RFID)
systems have attracted substantial attention from the industry
and the research communities. Since RFID tags are expected
to replace traditional barcodes, they will become one of the
most used devices in the near future. They present a wide col-
lection of applications that include: supply chain management,
warehouse inventory control, pet identification, secure passport
systems, anticounterfeiting tags for pharmaceutical products,
among others.
Despite the benefits that could been brought by the use of
RFID tags, some challenging issues emerge. The tag-reader
communication occurs by means of a wireless link, what
increases the system’s vulnerability against passive and active
adversaries. Additionally, RFID tags are highly constrained
devices and do not have the processing, storage, power and
communication resources necessary to implement standard
authentication protocols.
In order to provide lightweight authentication functionalities
to RFID systems, Hopper and Blum [9] introduced the HB
protocol, which was based on a well-known intractability
assumption: the Learning Parity with Noise (LPN) problem.
The LPN problem is NP complete and only involves the
use of binary vectors and inner products, what makes it an
appropriate choice for constrained devices. Later, Juels and
Weis [11] proved that HB was insecure against active adver-
saries and proposed an improved version of the protocol: the
HB+ protocol. However, Gilbert et al. [8] demonstrated that
HB+ was vulnerable to a class of man-in-the-middle attacks
known as GRS-MITM attacks. In pursuance of mitigating this
vulnerability, subsequent variants have been proposed: HB++
[4], HB* [5], and HB-MP [12]. Unfortunately, neither of them
succeeded. Their tolerance to GRS-MITM attacks is equivalent
to that of HB+ and they possess additional complexity and/or
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reduced practicality [7]. In 2008, Gilbert et al. [6] presented
their protocol version called HB#. This new variant solved
many drawbacks of its predecessors. Among them: it is prov-
ably secure against GRS-MITM attacks and presents a reduced
communication cost. Although HB# represented an evolution
in terms of efficiency and security, it was later shown that it
is vulnerable to a more general man-in-the middle adversary
[13].
As illustrated in the previous history line, the research
community effort has been directed to mitigating active attacks
based on a man-in-the-middle setting. Before proceeding fur-
ther, it is relevant to discuss the practical feasibility of man-in-
the-middle attacks against the HB-family. No implementation
of such attacks on RFID systems has been reported in the
literature yet as it apparently requires a sophisticated hardware
device capable of capturing and modifying the tag-reader
communications in real-time [14]. In this article, we offer an
alternative approach: a simple and effective fault attack that
can be applied to a wide collection of HB variants. In contrast
to MITM attacks, our approach has already been demonstrated
to be feasible in [10], where implementations of fault analytic
techniques over RFID tags have been made with low-cost
equipment.
Fault Analysis. Traditional cryptography often assumes that
secrets are stored in tamper-proof locations. Under this con-
ventional point of view, cryptographic systems are modeled as
black boxes, i.e., as ideal mathematical objects. Nevertheless,
cryptographic systems are implemented on physical devices,
which present potential side channels not considered by the
security models of theoretical cryptography. In this context,
fault analysis came into the scene as an alternative approach
on gathering secret data.
Fault attacks are focused on attacking the physical imple-
mentation of a given cryptosystem, rather than its algorithmic
structure. A fault attack relies on the principle that the cryptan-
alyst is allowed to manipulate the target device and induce it to
abnormally operate, making it to output faulty results. These
faulty results can later on be used by the cryptanalyst to derive
secret information. Depending on the implementation, there
are several fault induction techniques that can be deployed
over the target device: exposing its surface to focused light
beams, provoking variations in its power supply, exposing it
to heat or radiation, inducing clock variations, among others.
The introduction of fault analysis by Boneh et al. [3]
motivated an extensive research in the field. Since then, fault
analysis has been successfully applied to disrupt standard
symmetric [2] and asymmetric [1] ciphers. But there are no
such results for lightweight authentication protocols, which is
the intended goal of the present work.
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Contributions. This paper provides a fault analytic techniques
against the HB+ protocol. Our objective is to contribute to
the specialized literature by offering an alternative perspective
in the cryptanalysis of such protocols. The fault attack here
proposed presents various advantages over other active attacks:
(1) it does not require the eavesdropping of previous authen-
tication procedures, (2) it can be easily adapted to disrupt
other HB-variants, (3) technologically, it requires an affordable
physical apparatus. Our fault analysis model assumes a great
level of control over the cryptographic device. We leave as
an open problem the design and application of a weaker fault
analytic model.
Organization. This paper is organized as follows. In section
II, we briefly review the protocol HB+. Section III details
the fault analysis model here used. Section IV describes the
attacks and section V presents some performance results.
II. DESCRIPTION OF THE PROTOCOLS
Assume that tag and reader communicate by means of
a wireless insecure channel and share some piece of secret
information. The HB+ protocol is as follows:
Protocol HB+
Symbol Meaning
(x, y) k-bit secret key pair shared by tag and reader.
vi a noise bit, such that Pr[vi = 1] = η ∈
]
0, 1
2
[
.
⊕, and  bitwise XOR and inner product operations.
1) For i = 1 to r
a) The reader chooses a random k-bit string ai ∈
{0, 1}k and sends it to the tag.
b) The tag chooses a random k-bit string bi ∈ {0, 1}k
and sends it to the reader.
c) The tag computes zi = ai  x⊕ bi  y⊕ vi. After
computing zi, the tag sends it back to the reader.
d) The reader computes z∗i = ai  x ⊕ bi  y and
compares it to zi.
2) The reader accepts the authentication as valid if z∗i 6= zi
in less than ηr rounds.
Secret(x,y)Reader
Select bi ∈R {0, 1}k
Select ai ∈R {0, 1}k
Accept iff |zi = ai  x⊕ bi  y| ≥ t times.
Tag
bi
ai
Pr[vi = 1] = η
Compute zi = ai  x⊕ bi  y⊕ vi
Choose vi ∈R {0, 1}, s.t.
zi
Fig. 1. Description of the protocol HB+.
A legitimate tag interacting with a legitimate reader may be
rejected with probability PFR (probability of false rejection),
and an adversarial structure answering randomly at each round
may be accepted with probability PFA (probability of false
acceptance). For the HB+ protocol, these probabilities are
given below:
PFR =
r∑
i=ηr+1
(
r
i
)
ηi(1−η)r−i and PFA =
ηr∑
i=0
(
r
i
)
2−r
III. FAULT ANALYSIS MODEL
A. Assumed Fault Analysis Assumptions
At first, it is important to differentiate local fault injections
from global fault injections. Local fault injections affect only
specific regions of the device, while global fault injections
affect the entire device. Thus, local fault-injection methods
are more precise and can be directed to the specific device’s
regions that contain sensitive information. Our fault analytic
model relies on local fault injections applied to the RFID tag.
In such a fault analysis model, the adversary has physical
access to the device and is allowed to run it for several times
while provoking faults into chosen memory areas. Specifically,
we consider that the adversary is able to apply bit flipping
faults to either the RAM or the internal registers of the device.
Besides that, he/she can arbitrarily reset the cryptographic
device and later induce other randomly chosen faults into it.
Our fault analysis assumptions are the following ones:
• The adversary is allowed to change the content of chosen
memory areas to specific values, 0 or 1.
• The adversary is able to run the authentication procedure
as many times he/she needs.
• The adversary knows precisely the time the faults are met.
B. On the Possibility of Localized Fault Injections
Since we assume a strong adversarial model, it is important
to conjecture about the feasibility of the underlying attack. In
this field, significant results have been achieved by Hutter et al.
[10], who offered a detailed analysis about the vulnerabilities
of RFID tags to faults.
As previously stated, we assume that the adversary is able
to induce faults on specific parts of the device. In [10], the
authors show that it is possible to perform localized fault
injections on RFID tags by means of focused laser beams.
Their local fault-injection techniques relied on an affordable
physical apparatus: an optical microscope equipped with an
integrated incident illumination device, and a laser diode
mounted on the top of the microscope camera port.
Remarkably, the authors report that the microscope provided
the capability of exploring the device’s internal structure very
accurately. They describe that their method allowed them to
interfere data, control lines, memory blocks and driver circuits.
Thus, it is possible to conjecture that our fault analytic
model, despite being strong, is not far away from reality.
IV. DESCRIPTION OF THE ATTACK
Our method consists of performing fault insertions into the
device and trying to authenticate it on a legitimate reader.
Based on the result of the authentication procedure, the crypt-
analyst infers the actual value of the modified bit. The inherent
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beauty of this attack resides in the fact that the adversary is not
required to eavesdrop any previous authentication procedures.
Let w denote the memory area that stores the binary string
composed by the concatenation of the two secret keys, i.e.,
w = x||y, such that w ∈ {0, 1}2k.
The procedure FLIP(w[i],b) changes the memory content
of w[i] to the binary value b.
Algorithm 1 FLIPi(w, b): Flip the i-th bit of the string w to
b, such that b ∈ {0, 1}.
Require: w such that w ∈ {0, 1}m.
Ensure: w, such that w[i] = b, and for all j 6= i, w[j] = w[j].
The function HBplusAuthentication(v) denotes the process
of trying to authenticate by using a 2k -binary string v.
The function HBplusAuthentication(v) returns TRUE if the
authentication procedure succeeds, or returns FALSE if the
authentication procedure fails.
Algorithm 2 describes the attack on HB+.
Algorithm 2 BreakHBplus(w,q): Compute the two shared
secret keys x and y.
Require: Memory area w and parameter q ∈ N∗.
Ensure: The secret key pair (x, y), such that (x, y) ∈
{0, 1}k×{0, 1}k. The secret key pair is correctly discovered
with high probability.
for i = 1 to 2k do
FLIP(w[i], 0)
cont← 0
for j = 1 to q do
if HBplusAuthentication(w) then
counter ← counter + 1
end if
end for
if counter ≥ q/2 then
ExtractedKey[i]← 0
else
ExtractedKey[i]← 1
FLIP(w[i], 1)
end if
end for
x← ExtractedKey[1, . . . , k]
y← ExtractedKey[k + 1, . . . , 2k]
return (x, y)
V. PERFORMANCE RESULTS
A. Information Theoretic Measures
Prior to evaluating the effectiveness of the attack against
the protocol HB+, we shall define some information theoretic
quantities that will be useful in our analysis. Particularly, we
are interested in two tasks: (1) quantifying the correlation
between the key stored in the device and the key extracted
by the attacker and (2) characterizing the level of information
leaked by executing the underlying cryptanalytic method.
Let X and Y be discrete random variables defined over
finite alphabets X and Y , respectively. The definitions are as
follow:
The entropy of X can be visualized as the amount of
uncertainty contained in it and is given by:
H(X) = −
∑
x
PX(x) log2 PX(x), where 0 ≤ H(X) ≤ log2 |X |.
Loosely speaking, the equivocation of X given Y measures
the amount of remaining uncertainty on X given that Y is
known. Its definition is given next:
H(X|Y ) = −
∑
x,y
PXY (x, y) log2 PX|Y (x, y),
Where 0 ≤ H(X|Y ) ≤ H(X).
The mutual information between X and Y measures the
correlation between them and is defined as:
I(X;Y ) =
∑
x,y
PXY (x, y) log2
PXY (x, y)
PX(x)PY (y)
Where 0 ≤ I(X;Y ) ≤ H(X).
Additionally,
I(X;Y ) = H(X)−H(X|Y ).
B. Results
Probability of Failure.
In the first place, we shall calculate the probability of com-
mitting an error when retrieving a single bit of a shared secret
key. This probability of error can be trivially derived.
Lemma 1: Let w ∈ {0, 1}2k denote a uniformly distributed
secret key stored in a RFID tag, and let w′q ∈ {0, 1}2k denote
the key guessed by an attacker who executes q queries to
the device. The probability of error, i.e., the probability of
retrieving the bit w′q[i] = b when the actual bit is w[i] = b, is
given by:
Pe(q) =
q∑
i=bq/2c+1
(
q
i
)
(p)i(1− p)q−i
Where p = Pr (w′1[i] 6= w[i]) =
1
2
(PFA + PFR).
Proof: Initially, we obtain the probability of error when
one single query (q = 1) is executed by the attacker.
p =
∑
b∈{0,1}
Pr (w[i] = b) · Pr (w′1[i] = b |w[i] = b)
=
1
2
· Pr (w′1[i] = 1 |w[i] = 0) +
1
2
· Pr (w′1[i] = 0 |w[i] = 1)
• Pr (w′1[i] = 1 |w[i] = 0).
In this case, the adversary injects a zero into the position
w[i]. Consequently, the attacker’s action did not alter the
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value of the stored secret key and the tag remains valid.
An error occurs if the reader rejects the tag.
Pr (w′1[i] = 1 |w[i] = 0) = PFR
• Pr (w′1[i] = 0 |w[i] = 1).
After the fault injection, the value of the stored secret key
is modified, and the tag is no longer valid. Consequently,
the reader is expected to reject the tag. An error occurs
if the reader authenticates the tag.
Pr (w′1[i] = 1 |w[i] = 0) = PFA
Therefore, p = 12 (PFA + PFR).
In the next step we calculate the probability of error when an
arbitrary number q of queries is executed, which is given by:
Pe(q) =
q∑
i=bq/2c+1
(
q
i
)
(p)i(1− p)q−i
Figure 2 shows the graphic of p = f(η, r). We may conclude
that the more reliable is the authentication procedure, the
more reliable is the fault analytic method. Furthermore, it is
easily observable that Pe(q) asymptotically goes to zero for
sufficiently large q.
p
Number of roundsNoise level
900,0
0,0
0,1
0,1
0,2
70
0,3
0,2
0,4
0,5
0,3
50
0,4 30
0,5
Loading plottools
Fig. 2. Probability of error as a function of η (the noise level) and r (number
of r unds).
Information Leakage.
We analyze the effectiveness of the attack by using the
definitions in section V-A. We also empirically demonstrate
that Pe(q) approaches zero for a sufficiently large number of
queries.
One can see that the process of extracting one isolated bit of
the secret key is analogous to the process of transmitting a sin-
gle bit over a binary symmetric channel (BSC) with crossover
probability p(η, r). Let h(p) = −p log p− (1− p) log(1− p)
denote the binary entropy function, for the specific case where
the key is uniformly distributed, we have that H(w[i] |w′q[i]) =
h(Pe(q)) and I
(
w[i];w′q[i]
)
= 1− h(Pe(q)).
We can observe that H(w[i] |w′q[i]) → 0 and
I
(
w[i];w′q[i]
) → 1 for sufficiently large q. This is illustrated
in the next tables.
Furthermore, we should point out that the underlying attack
requires the injection of 2k faults and the realization of
2kq authentication procedures. Thus it presents a linear time
complexity O(k).
q Pe(q) H(w[i] |w′q [i]) I
(
w[i] ;w′q [i]
)
7 0.0289 0.2943 0.8111
11 0.0094 0.1888 0.9227
17 0.0019 0.772 0.9800
19 0.0011 0.0199 0.9873
TABLE I
RESULTS FOR PARAMETERS η = 0.125, r = 40, p(0.125, 40) = 0.1919.
q Pe(q) H(w[i] |w′q [i]) I
(
w[i] ;w′q [i]
)
7 0.0384 0.2348 0.7651
11 0.0143 0.1080 0.8919
17 0.0035 0.0334 0.9666
19 0.0022 0.0225 0.9775
TABLE II
RESULTS FOR PARAMETERS η = 0.125, r = 80, p(0.125, 80) = 0.2084.
q Pe(q) H(w[i] |w′q [i]) I
(
w[i] ;w′q [i]
)
7 0.0462 0.2702 0.7298
11 0.0187 0.1341 0.8656
17 0.0051 0.0465 0.9535
19 0.0033 0.0326 0.9674
TABLE III
RESULTS FOR PARAMETERS η = 0.25, r = 80, p(0.25, 80) = 0.2201.
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